Chapter 6. Reliability Data Sources

Mary Ann Lundteigen Marvin Rausand

RAMS Group Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering NTNU

(Version 0.1)



Lundteigen& Rausand

Learning Objectives

The main learning objectives associated with these slides are to:

- Introduce and discuss different data types
- Give examples of different data sources
- Present an approach for esimating reliability data, when limited experience is available for the prevailing operating environment

The slides include topics from Chapter 6 in **Reliability of Safety-Critical Systems: Theory and Applications**. DOI:10.1002/9781118776353.

Outline of Presentation

Introduction







5 New Technology

Types of Data

Many different types of data (or information) may be relevant in the analysis of system reliability:

- Technical data/information: Data and information that is needed to identify and understand how elements, channels and subystems are operating
- **Operational data:** Data and information about mode of operation, environemental exposure, operating conditions and so on
- Reliability data: Failure rates or mean time to failure (MTTF), or data that support the estimation of these. The following sub-categories of reliability data are often used:
- Test and maintenance data: Associated data of relevance for the analysis related to testing and maintenenance, such as proof test intervals, mean test or inspection time, mean repair time, diagnostic test intervals, mean restoration time after a DD failure, proof test coverage, and so on.

Types of Reliability Data

Reliability data may be classified into:

- Generic data: Data collected by an organization and published in handbooks. The collected data may be for specific component types (not brands), and may be a combination of operating experience, manufacturer data *applicable for a specific industry sector or specific usagen conditions* (e.g., offshore oil and gas industry).
- Manufacturer (brand) data: Data provided for a particular component brand, based on manufacturers internal statistics on reported failures, in-house testing, or failure rate estimation techniques.
- User-provided (experience) data: Data collected by a specific user, at a specific site or plant or for a selection of sites/plants.
- Expert judgment: Data constructed on the basis of experts opinions and experience. May be an option when systematic data collection has not been carried out or when new technology is introduced to a system.

Data Types

Application of Data



Data Sources

Types of Reliability Data Sources

Maintenance system:

A site's or plant's maintenance system, and is not accessible unless approved by the site/plant owner

Accident and incident databases:

Published by organizations and authorities), often with basis in mandatory reporting of serious incidents (e.g., events with a major accident potential) or accidents.

Component reliability databases:

Data handbooks and data bases constructed on the basis of generic data.

A high number of generic data sources are available:

Standards	General	Offshore/Process industry
IEC 61709 IEC TR 62380 ISO 13849-1	MIL-HDBK-217F NPRD-2011 (RIAC) FIDES Telecordia SR332 Siemens SN29500 MechRel Handbook (NSWC-11)	OREDA PDS data handbook Exida

More information about each data source is provided in the textbook.

It is important to document where the failure rates origin from, and what assumptions that have been made.

■ Data dossier: A data sheet that presents and justifies the choice of data for each element included in the reliability model.

An example of a data dossier is shown in the textbook. Also data handbooks may provide similar layout of their data dossiers.

Data Dossier

Data Dossier in PDS Data Handbook

5.1.10 Smoke Detector

 $\lambda_{crit} = 3.7$ $\lambda_D = 1.3 \text{ per } 10^6 \text{ hrs}$

$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$	Module: Input Component: S	Devices moke Detector		PDS Reliability Data Dossier		
Recommended Values for Calculation Tool rate Coverage Undetected rate Tool rate Tool rate Coverage Undetected rate $\lambda_{cm} = 1.2 \text{ per 10}^6 \text{ hrs} c_m = 0.40 \lambda_{cm} = 0.7 \text{ per 10}^6 \text{ hrs} \lambda_{cm} = 3.2 \text{ per 10}^6 \text{ hrs} c_m = 0.30 \lambda_{cm} = 1.4 \text{ per 10}^6 \text{ hrs} \lambda_{cm} = 0.4 $ Coverage The failure rate stimute is an update of the 2006 figure which was primarily blased on OREDA The failure rate stimute is an update of the 2006 figure which was primarily blased on OREDA The failure rate stimute is an update of the 2006 figure which was primarily blased on OREDA The failure rate stimute is an update of the 2006 figure which was primarily blased on OREDA The failure rate difficure and the failure has been assumed coverage of 0.5% (observed in OREDA incomplete and complete plase III were 29% and 50%, to been assumed to been values of the coverage rate of the failure state of the failure state of the failure state state and the state assuming coverage of 0.5% (observed in OREDA incomplete and complete plase III were 29% and 50%, to been assumed to observations and target coverage in the state assumed to observations as well as expert judgement: has been assumed exposed. The estimate rate of the failure access for existed absect on failure exposed. The estimate rate of the state assumed to observed failure cases for cricial detector failure exposed. The estimate rate of the state assumed to observed failure cases for cricial detector failure failure rate of the state associated on observed failure cases for cricial detector failure failure rate. Failure Rate Reference Overall failure rate coverage as a failure failure failure coverage as a failure failure rate of the failure failure coverage of the state failure rate coverage failure failure rate of the failure rate of the failure failure coverage failure failure rate of the failure rate of the failure failure coverage failure failure rate of the coverage failure coverage failure coverage failure failure rate of the failure rate of the failure rate of th	The detector in	cludes the sensor and	2009-12-18 Remarks			
Total rate Coverage Undetected rate $\lambda_{co} = 1.2 \text{ pc} 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $c_{co} = 0.40$ $\lambda_{ce} = 0.7 \text{ pc} 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $\lambda_{co} = 2.0 \text{ pc} 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $c_{co} = 0.40$ $\lambda_{ce} = 0.7 \text{ pc} 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $\lambda_{co} = 3.2 \text{ pc} 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $c_{co} = 0.30$ $\lambda_{sol} = 1.4 \text{ pc} 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $\lambda_{co} = 3.2 \text{ pc} 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $p_{TW} = 1.10^{-3}$ $r = 0.4$ Assessment The rate of DU failures is estimated still assuming to coverage of $10^6 N_{coverage} of 10^6 N_{coverage}$	Recommende	d Values for Calculation	The contained	introduction of the second s		
$\begin{split} \lambda_{\rm esc} &= 2.0 \text{per 10}^{6} \text{hrs} & c_{\rm s} &= 0.30 \qquad \lambda_{\rm esc} &= 1.4 \text{per 10}^{6} \text{hrs} \\ \lambda_{\rm esc} &= 3.2 \text{per 10}^{6} \text{hrs} & p_{\rm HF} &= 1 \cdot 10^{3} \\ \hline r &= 0.4 \\ \hline \hline \textbf{Accement} & Tree rate contrastic is an update of the 2006 figure which was primarily based on OREDA to the 100 model of 0.8 (b) down on phase V data r the rate of 0.7 (b) down on phase V data r the rate of 0.7 (b) down on phase V data r the rate of 0.7 (b) down on phase V data r the rate of 0.7 (b) down on phase V data r the rate of 0.7 (b) down on phase V data r the rate of 0.7 (b) down on phase V data r the rate of 0.7 (b) down on the set of 0.8 (b) down on the rate of 0.7 (b) down on the set of 0.7 (b) down on the rate of$			Coverage	Undetected rate		
$\begin{array}{c c} \lambda_{cont} = 3.2 \ {\rm per} \ 10^6 \ {\rm hrs} & {\rm P}_{100} = 1 \cdot 10^3 \\ \hline \qquad \qquad$	$\lambda_D =$	1.2 per 106 hrs	z _D = 0.40	$\lambda_{DU} = 0.7 \text{ per } 10^6 \text{ hrs}$		
r = 0.4 Assessment The fullure rate estimate is an update of the 2006 figure which was primarily based on OREDA place III as well as some phase V data. The rate of DU failures is estimated still assuming overage ofly. The other V data The rate of DU failures is estimated still assuming overage ofly. The other V data The rate of DU failures is estimated still assuming overage ofly. The other V data The rate of DU failures is estimated still assuming overage ofly. The other V data The rate of DU failures is estimated still assuming overage ofly. The other V data The rate of DU failures is estimated other values of the other V data The rate of DU failures is estimated. It should be noted that for some type of some detectors with more extensive self (est, the overage may be significantly higher: This must be assumed for each specific detector type. The Puge Is based on expert judgement: has been assumed of the other V value is based on observed failure cases for ortical detector failures respond: The estimated rate is based on observed failure cases for ortical detector failures respond: The estimated values is based on observed failure cases for ortical detect failures of the main attemption of the main agaments is provided in section 3. Failure Eack Reference Foreral Fore of the Puge in the state of the Puge in the failure mode for the puge in the puge in the puge in the failure Assumed for eacle addition in 2006-edition Assumed for eacle addition in 2006-edition in 2006-edi	$\lambda_s =$	2.0 per 106 hrs	c _s = 0.30	$\lambda_{SU} = 1.4 \text{ per } 10^6 \text{ hrs}$		
Accessment The failure rate estimate is an update of the 2006 figure which was primarily based on OREDA phase III as well as some phase V data. The rate of DU failures is estimated still assuming overage of 0.4% (observed in OREDA horemether and complete and complete phase III were SPA and 50%, respectively). The rate of dangerous and safe failures has been slightly decreased based on observations from failure reviews and lator OREDA phase III observations and submit or extensive self set is though end of that for some type of smoke detectors with more extensive self its, the coverage of 1.0% (Secorega e-matrix) based on OREDA phase III observations fail observations from failure exits and safe failure share been assumed for the detectors with three stimules of the stimule evidence in a data is based on the assumption that the detectors are exposed. The estimated r value is based on observed failure causes for critical detector future arguments is provided in section 3.3. Failure Rate Reference Overall failure rate of asserved for the state or the state of the state and the state of the sta	$\lambda_{crit} =$	3.2 per 10 ⁶ hrs	$P_{TIF} = 1$	10-3		
Accessment The failure rate estimate is an update of the 2006 figure which was primarily based on OREDA phase III as well as some phase V data. The rate of DU failures is estimated still assuming overage of 0.4% (observed in OREDA horemether and complete and complete phase III were SPA and 50%, respectively). The rate of dangerous and safe failures has been slightly decreased based on observations from failure reviews and lator OREDA phase III observations and submit or extensive self set is though end of that for some type of smoke detectors with more extensive self its, the coverage of 1.0% (Secorega e-matrix) based on OREDA phase III observations fail observations from failure exits and safe failure share been assumed for the detectors with three stimules of the stimule evidence in a data is based on the assumption that the detectors are exposed. The estimated r value is based on observed failure causes for critical detector future arguments is provided in section 3.3. Failure Rate Reference Overall failure rate of asserved for the state or the state of the state and the state of the sta			r = 0	4		
	mainly based of It should be no coverage may The P _{TIF} is bas exposed. The of (40% "expecte arguments is p	on OREDA phase III obse- ted that for some type of s be significantly higher. The sed on expert judgements as setimated <i>P</i> value is based and wear and tear" and 60% rovided in section 3.3.	vations as well as moke detectors wi is must be assessed and is based on the on observed failure	expert judgement - has been assumed, th more extensive self test, the d for each specific detector type, assumption that the detectors are causes for critical detector failures		
		1				
$\lambda_{00} = 0.8 \text{ per } 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $\lambda_{5TU} = 1.4 \text{ per } 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ I_{12} Assumed $c_0 = 40\%$	failure rate (per 10 ⁶ hrs)		Data source/con	nment		
	$\lambda_{crit} = 3.7$	$\lambda_{DU} = 0.8 \text{ per } 10^6 \text{ hrs}$ $\lambda_{STU} = 1.4 \text{ per } 10^6 \text{ hrs}$	[12]	,		

Recommended values for calculation in 2004- and

New technology

New technology is by DNV-GL RP considered as:

- (Totally) new technology (unproven design principles)
- Proven technology in new environment
- Proven technology operated in a new way

How can we identify applicable reliability data in this case?

New technology and SIS

E/E/PE technology is developing fast, an generic data provided at the component level (e.g., a logic solver) becomes outdated almost before it is published.

Is it possible to apply previous reliability data at all?

Brissaud et al (2010) have proposed an approach for this purpose. See the more exact reference in the textbook.

A Suggested Approach

- 1. Identify λ_B , using generic reliability databases, observed failures, or expert judgments for the reference (proven) technology. There is no specific rules about confidence limits, but it may be considered if a more conservative value should be selected rather than a maximum likelihood/mean value.
- 2. Identify factors that are assumed to be highly influential for this failure rate. Try to keep the number of factors as low as possible, and combine factors that are highly dependent on each other. For the *k* remaining factors, do as follows:
 - Denote each influencing factor y₁, y₂ ...y_k
 - Define the *nominal level* (e.g. industry average) for these factors, and denote these by: y_{0,1}, y_{0,2}...y_{0,k}.

Example of nominal values for a selection of influencing factors:

Example

No	Influencing factor	Nominal value	No	Influencing factor	Nominal value
1	Temperature	-5° - +20° C	4	Technology maturity	High
2	Environment	Outside, offshore	5	Diagnostic coverage	75%
3	Frequency of use	< 1 per year	6	Testing/ inspection frequency	1 year/ 1 year

3. Weight the influencing factors, using input from several experts and physical and engineering knowledge. Make sure that $\sum_{i=1}^{k} \omega_i = 1$.

Example of values assigned as nominal for a selection of influencing factors, with possible weights added:

Example							
No	Influencing factor	Nominal value	Weight	No	Influencing factor	Nominal value	Weight
1	Temperature	-5° - +20°	15%	4	Technology maturity	High	15%
2	Environment	Outside, off- shore	20%	5	Diagnostic coverage	75%	15%
3	Frequency of use	< 1 per year	20%	6	Testing/ inspection frequency	1 year/ 1 year	15%

4. Identify the new values of the influencing factors and denote these by *y*_{c,1}, *y*_{c,2}..*y*_{c,k}

Example								
No	Influencing factor	New value	Weight	No	Influencing factor	New value	Weight	
1	Temperature	0 - +4 ^{<i>o</i>}	15%	4	Technology maturity	Medium (due to design changes)	15%	
2	Environment	Subsea, 400 meter water depth	20%	5	Diagnostic coverage	90%	15%	
3	Frequency of use	< 1 per year	20%	6	Testing/ inspection frequency	1 year/ 5 years	15%	

New Technology

A Suggested Approach (cont.)

- 5. Determine the effect of the new values $\sigma_{c,i}$ for each influencing factor y_i , $i = 1, 2 \dots k$, using the following rules:
 - $\sigma_{c,i} = 1$, when $y_{c,i} \approx y_{0,i}$
 - $\sigma_{c,i} < 1$, when $y_{c,i}$ is more *benign* than $y_{0,i}$
 - $\sigma_{c,i} > 1$, when $y_{c,i}$ is more *hostile* than $y_{0,i}$
- 6. Calculate the failure rate λ_P for the new technology using equation (1) on next slide

The approach does not specify how much > 1 or how much < 1.

Equation:

$$\lambda_{\rm P} = \lambda_{\rm B} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{k} \omega_{\rm i} \cdot \sigma_{\rm c,i} \tag{1}$$

where k is the number of influencing factors, ω_i is the weight of the influencing factor, and $\sigma_{c,i}$ is the value assigned to influencing factor *i*, with $i = 1 \cdots k$.

A Suggested Approach: Case study

In this example, we assume for the 6 influencing factors that:

- $\sigma_{c,i} = 0.5$, when $y_{c,i}$ is more *benign* than $y_{0,i}$
- $\sigma_{c,i} = 2.0$, when $y_{c,i}$ is more *hotile* than $y_{0,i}$ (except for influencing factor *i*=2, where a value σ of 10 is used)

We also assume that $\lambda_{\rm B} = 2.6 \cdot 10^{-6}$ per hour.

$$\lambda_{\rm P} = \lambda_{\rm B} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{k} \omega_{\rm i} \cdot \sigma_{\rm c,i}$$

= 2.6 \cdot 10^{-6} \cdot [0.15 \cdot 1 + 0.20 \cdot 10.0 + 0.20 \cdot 1
+0.15 \cdot 2.0 + 0.15 \cdot 0.5 + 0.15 \cdot 2.0] per hour = 1.02 \cdot 10^{-5} per hour

A Suggested Approach: Some Considerations

There are several questions that may arise, and that may influence the uncertainty associated with the new failure rate:

- Have all relevant influencing factors been captured?
- Are the weights reasonable? Will also the weights change with the new technology?
- Are the values of $\sigma_{c,i}$ reasonable?

A reasonable question is how to capture and express uncertainty about the failure rate in this context. This is not a part of the method as it is now.